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1 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in 1974, codified at 2 U.S.C. §§43-
455. The laws providing for the public funding of presidential candidates are technically distinct
from FECA. See Presidential Campaign Fund Act, codified at 26 U.S.C. §§9001-9012,  
Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act, codified at 26 U.S.C. §§9031-9042. I will,
however, be referring to FECA as a shorthand for the federal campaign finance laws generally,
including the presidential public funding laws.
2 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
3 Soft money is explained more fully at text at notes 25-36, infra.
4 The concept of issue advocacy is explained at text at notes 37-49, infra.
5 Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
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THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
Richard Briffault
The major political parties present a central, and particularly nettlesome, difficulty for
federal campaign finance regulation. In the last decade, party campaign finance practices have
blown large, and widening, holes in the campaign finance system created by Congress in the
Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”)1, and modified and sustained by the Supreme Court in
Buckley v Valeo.2 Through the development of soft money,3 the parties have enabled donors to
avoid FECA’s contribution limits, its ban on the use of corporate and union treasury funds in
federal elections, and the spending limits imposed on  presidential candidates who choose to
accept public funding. Through the exploitation of so-called issue advocacy advertising,4 the
parties have been able to channel millions of dollars otherwise prohibited by FECA into the heart
of federal election campaigns. The Supreme Court’s 1996 determination that parties may engage
in independent spending in support of party candidates5 has provided the parties with yet another
2
opening to evade the basic structure of FECA, although the greater opportunities offered by the
combination of soft money and issue advocacy have, for the moment at least, muted the role of
party independent spending.
These party finance techniques are not simply instances of clever adaptation to the FECA-
Buckley regime – although the gaming of the system by donors and politicians and the failure of
Congress over the last two decades to respond to campaign finance innovations are part of the
story. Rather, these party practices grow out of fault lines central to the constitutional law of
campaign finance. As a result, closing the loopholes exploited by the parties presents difficult
constitutional questions. Nevertheless, as I will indicate in this article, new rules that would curb
the party activities that are eroding the campaign finance laws can be adopted consistent with the
principles enunciated in Buckley. Indeed, such laws are essential to address a fundamental concern
of the FECA-Buckley regime -- the prevention of the undue influence of private wealth, and the
appearance of such influence, on government decision-making.  
This Article considers the place of the major political parties in our campaign finance
system -- the role the parties currently play, the constitutional doctrines that must be considered in
regulating the parties, and the reasons for regulating party activities currently beyond the scope of
FECA, and some legislative proposals for bringing party campaign finance practices into closer
compliance with the values that inform our campaign finance laws. Part I analyzes how FECA
affects the parties, and how, in turn the major party campaign finance innovations emerged
outside of FECA and are now eroding the federal campaign finance laws. 
Part II considers the application of the Buckley doctrine to the parties. Buckley sharply
distinguishes between contributions to a candidate and independent support for a candidate, and
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between the discussion of  political issues and efforts to elect candidates. Buckley’s lines are
harder to draw and make less sense in the party context, than when applied to other politically
active organizations. Indeed, parties are particularly well-positioned to take advantage of these
aspects of the Buckley doctrine to get around FECA’s restrictions. More deeply, Buckley
provides that the only basis for limiting campaign finance activities is to prevent corruption and
the appearance of corruption, but many political scientists and several members of the Supreme
Court have argued that party campaign finance activities raise little danger of corruption. If they
are right, then all present and proposed rules limiting party money rest on a shaky constitutional
foundation.
I will argue that party activities do, indeed,  raise dangers of corruption within Buckley’s
meaning. Indeed, I will suggest that, due to the close structural connection between parties and
their candidates and the overarching concern of the major parties with winning elections and
wielding power in government, the parties should be constitutionally more easy -- not more
difficult -- to regulate than other politically active organizations. The doctrinal distinctions
Buckley draws can and should be interpreted differently in the party context so as to include more
party activities within the scope of campaign finance regulation.
In Part III, I will present and defend proposals for dealing with the three most pressing
party threats to the campaign finance system: independent expenditures, soft money, and issue
advocacy. These proposals seek to harmonize the rights of parties to engage in constitutionally
protected political activity, and the benefits of party participation in federal elections, with the
goal of  restoring the integrity of the campaign finance system.  These proposals should not be
seen as anti-party. The parties play a positive role in our political system. Indeed, I will suggest
6 In text, I discuss FECA’s limits on contributions to parties, and on party support of
candidates. The Act also imposes reporting and disclosure requirements on the parties, and
makes the parties whose presidential candidates qualify for public funding eligible for funds to
defray the costs of their presidential nominating conventions. Some commentators found that the
reporting requirements have had a real impact on party participation in federal elections. They
have suggested that FECA’s rules contributed to the centralization of party activity from the local
to the state level and, at least until the parties became more familiar with FECA, tended to
discourage state party involvement in federal races. See, e.g., Xandra Kayden, The Nationalizing
of the Party System 262-65 in Michael J. Malbin ed., PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS, AND
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS (1980); Paul S. Herrnson, PARTY CAMPAIGNING IN THE 1980S 28-29
(1988).
7  Under FECA, “person” includes “an individual, partnership, committee, association,
corporation, labor organization, or any other organization or group of persons” other than the
federal government. 2 U.S.C. § 431 (11). FECA imposes additional restrictions on corporations
and unions. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b.
8 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(B),(C). The limit on contributions to a state party committee also
includes contributions to any local party committee within that state.
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that once party money is brought back under FECA, increasing money the parties are allowed to
spend in support of their candidates would actually be desirable. But unlimited contributions to,
and unlimited spending by, the parties jeopardize the anti-corruption values at the heart of
campaign finance law. Unless party money is subject to effective limits, campaign finance reform
is doomed to failure.
I. Party Money Under, and Outside of,  FECA
A. FECA and the Parties  6 
FECA limits donations to parties by individuals and political action committees (“PACs”).
It provides that a person7 may contribute up to $20,000 per calendar year to the national
committees of a  political party, and up to $5000 per calendar year to a state party committee for
activities in connection with federal elections.8 A PAC can contribute up to $15,000 per calendar
The Act imposes much lower limits on individual contributions to candidates and PACs. 
A person can contribute no more than $1000 per election to a federal candidate, and no more than
$5000 per calendar year to a PAC. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A), 2(A). Total election-related
contributions by an individual to candidates, PACs, and party committees may not exceed
$25,000 in any calendar year. 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(3).
9 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(B),(C). A PAC may not contribute more than $5000 per election
to a federal candidate, nor more than $5000 per calendar year to another PAC. 2 U.S.C. §
441a(2)(A), (C). There is no annual limit on aggregate PAC contributions to candidates, party
committees and other PACs.
10 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a).
11 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A).
12  FECA treats primary, runoff, and general elections as different elections. 2 U.S.C. §
431 (1)(A). Thus, in a typical election cycle in which a candidate contests both a primary and a
general election, the limit on PAC and party committee donations to a candidate is $10,000.
Similarly, the $1000 cap on individual donations to a candidate is $2000 per election cycle. As a
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year to the national committees of a party, and $5000 per calendar year to a state party committee
for federal election activity.9 Corporations and labor unions are prohibited from making any
contributions to party activities in support of federal candidates, but they may sponsor PACs that
can give to party committees, subject to the dollar limits applicable to PAC contributions.10 
FECA’s limits on donations to parties generally track the Act’s limits on donations to and by
PACs, except that the limits on donations to parties are higher than the limits on donations to
other political committees.
FECA’s limits on party support for candidates are also modeled on the Act’s limits on
PAC contributions to candidates, although once again FECA treats parties more generously than
it treats PACs. Like PACs,11 party committees -- including the national committee, the Senate
campaign committee, the House campaign committee, and the state party committee -- are each
permitted by FECA to donate up to $5000 to a federal candidate per election.12 
rule, parties do not contribute to candidates in contested primaries. See Paul S. Herrnson,
National Party Organizations at the Century’s End 65 in L. SANDY MAISEL, ED., THE PARTIES
RESPOND: CHANGES IN AMERICAN PARTIES AND CAMPAIGNS (3d ed. 1998).
There is one special rule which permits a party national committee, its Senate campaign
committee, or the two together to contribute $17,500 to a Senate candidate per campaign, e.g.,
primary and general election together. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(h).
13 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(7)(B)(i).
14 The limits for Senate and presidential races are also based on voting age population
“VAP”). A party national committee may spend 2 cents per VAP , inflation-adjusted from a 1974
base, in support of the party’s Presidential ticket. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(2). Under this formula, each
of the two major national parties will be able to spend $13.3 million in coordinated spending in
support of its presidential ticket in 2000. FEC Release, “If the Presidential Election Were Held in
1999,” July 7, 1999, http://www.fec.gov/press/spend99.htm. The national and state parties may
also each spend the greater of $20,000 in 1974 dollars,  or 2 cents in 1974 prices times state VAP 
in coordinated expenditures in connection party Senate candidates, or  House of Representatives
candidates in a state which has only one House seat.  2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3)(A). The coordinated
spending limit for party spending in support of other House candidates is $10,000, inflation-
adjusted from a 1974 base.  2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3)(B).   In 1998, limits on party coordinated
spending for Senate candidates ranged from $130,200 in Alaska to $3,035,874 in California. The
limit in House races was $32,550 in most states, and $65,100 in states with only one
congressional district.  FEC Release, “FEC Announces 1998 Party Spending Limits: Amounts
Range from $130,200 to $3 Million,” March 6, 1998, http://www.fec.gov/press/441ad.htm. 
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FECA, however, offers the parties two special opportunities, unavailable to PACs, to
provide candidates with financial support. First, the parties may engage in “coordinated
expenditures.” FECA treats money that is not given to a candidate but spent by an individual or
organization in coordination with a candidate as though it were a contribution to that candidate,
subject to the Act’s contribution ceiling.13 However, FECA authorizes party committees – and
only party committees –  to engage in coordinated expenditures with candidates that do not count
against the contribution caps. Party coordinated expenditures are subject to dollar limits, but these
limits  are much higher than the Act’s limits on contributions and they are adjusted for inflation.14
In addition, a state party committee may designate a national party committee -- such as the
15 See, e.g., FRANK J. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE: MYTHS AND REALITIES 227
(1992). The Supreme Court upheld the transfer of such spending authority in FEC v Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27 (1981).
16 Federal Election Commission, “FEC Reports on Political Party Activity for 1997-98,”
April 9, 1999, http://www.fec.gov/press/ptyye98.htm.
These figures may understate the value of coordinated expenditures. Most coordinated
expenditures consist of in-kind services: the provision of polling data, mailing lists, assistance with
fundraising, campaign management, opposition research, and preparation and placement of
advertising. These services are often obtained from consultants who provide them to the parties,
as repeat participants in the political process, as a discount, so that their value to the candidate is
likely to exceed the cost to the party. See ANTHONY GIERZYNSKI, LEGISLATIVE PARTY CAMPAIGN
COMMITTEES IN THE AMERICAN STATES 53-54 (1992); Herrnson, supra, at 73 (party in-kind
campaign services “are worth many times more than their reported value”).
17 2 U.S.C. §431(8)(B)(xi),(xii),(9)(B)(viii),(ix).
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Senate campaign committee for Senate elections or the House campaign committee for elections
to the House of Representatives -- as its “agent” for  coordinated spending.15 As the national
committees are more successful at fundraising, such agency agreements make it easier for the
parties to engage in the maximum coordinated spending permitted by law, and they effectively
double the national committee’s coordinated expenditure ceiling. Coordinated expenditures are a
far more important form of party campaign activity than direct contributions to candidates. In the
last three election cycles, national Republican and Democratic contributions to congressional
candidates totaled $14.7 million, but aggregate coordinated expenditures by the parties came to
$129.4 million.16 
Second, state party committees may undertake, without limitation, certain “grass-roots”
spending in support of federal candidates. These expenditures include payments for campaign
materials used in connection with volunteer activities on behalf of party nominees, and for voter
registration and get-out-the-vote drives.17 Grass-roots spending must be funded by contributions
18 See, e.g., Herrnson, National Party Organizations, in Maisel, supra, at 59 (the national
party organizations raise most of their hard money in the form of direct mail contributions under
$100); LEON EPSTEIN, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE AMERICAN MOLD 276-78 (1986) (contrasting
historic dependence of the parties on a small number of very large donors with the post-FECA
development of a mass financial base).
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that comply with FECA’s dollar caps and source prohibitions, but there is no ceiling on the
amount state parties can spend on these activities.  Although nominally a spending opportunity for
states parties, the grass-roots exemptions strongly benefit the national parties, which typically
raise the funds for grass-roots spending and then transfer them to state and local parties, with
directions concerning how they are to be used to aid federal candidates.
The parties, particularly the national party committees, have done well under FECA. They
raise far more money than they ever did before, and they are playing a growing role in the
financing of federal election campaigns. The Act’s limits on donations to candidates, coupled with
the sharp rise in campaign costs, place a premium on intermediary organizations like PACs and
party committees that can help candidates obtain funds and defray some of their campaign costs.
Although initially PACs were the preeminent beneficiaries of FECA, over the course of the 1980s
the national parties emerged as important financial participants in federal elections. For the first
time, the national party committees built up a mass financial base, accumulating large aggregates
of money through relatively small donations from a large number of donors.18 Due to their
fundraising prowess, the party congressional campaign committees (“CCC’s”) -- which are
composed of members of Congress organized by party and chamber -- are now significant players
in congressional races. They provided candidates with money, aid them in raising funds from
PACs and individual donors, and are involved in candidate recruitment, campaign management,
19 The rising financial and campaign role of the CCC’s under FECA is examined in ROBIN
KOLODNY: PURSUING MAJORITIES: CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEES IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 124-55 (1998) and PAUL S. HERRNSON, PARTY CAMPAIGNING IN THE 1980S 30-83
(1988).
20 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
21 Kirk J. Nahra, Political Parties and the Campaign Finance Laws: Dilemmas, Concerns
and Opportunities, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 97 (1987); David Adamany, Political Parties in the
1980s 72-73, in Michael J. Malbin, ed., MONEY AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES: FINANCING
ELECTIONS IN THE 1980S (1984); F. Christopher Arterton, Political Money and Party Strength
116 in Joel L. Fleishman, ed., THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES: THE CHALLENGE
OF GOVERNANCE (1982). Accord, FEC v Democratic Sen. Camp. Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 28 n.1
(1981) (“Party committees are considered incapable of making ‘independent’ expenditures in
connection with the campaigns of their party’s candidates”).
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the production and placement of candidate ads, and the mobilization of voters.19
In recent years, the party campaign finance role has been further expanded and reshaped
by three new mechanisms developed outside the strictures of FECA: party independent
expenditures; soft money; and party issue advocacy.  These devices, however, pose direct
challenges to FECA’s contribution and spending restrictions.
B. The Growing Role of Party Money Outside of FECA
(1) Party Independent Expenditures: Buckley v. Valeo20 invalidated the FECA provision
that would have capped the amount of money an individual or group could spend independently
of a candidate in support of that candidate or against her opponent, thus permitting individuals
and PACs to spend unlimited amounts of money on so-called “independent expenditures.” In the
first two decades following Buckley it was widely assumed that party electoral spending is
necessarily coordinated with candidates, and, thus, that parties could not take advantage of the
Supreme Court’s protection of independent expenditures.21 In 1996, however, in Colorado
22 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
23 This compares with $34.7 million in contributions to and coordinated expenditures with
candidates in 1996. See “FEC Reports on Political Party Activity for 1997-98,” supra.
24 Id.
25 See Paul S. Herrnson and Diana Dwyre, Party Issue Advocacy in Congressional
Election Campaigns, 90, in John C. Green & Daniel M. Shea, THE STATE OF THE PARTIES: THE
CHANGING ROLE OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PARTIES (3d ed. 1999).
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Republican Federal Campaign Committee v Federal Election Commission,22 a Supreme Court
plurality determined that a party may engage in independent spending, and that such party
spending is entitled to the same constitutional protection from limitation that extends to
independent spending by PACs or individuals. 
Colorado Republican provided the parties with a major opportunity to avoid FECA’s
limits on party spending in congressional races. In the months immediately following Colorado
Republican, the national Republican Party put together a $10 million independent expenditure
program, primarily supporting the party’s Senate candidates.23 The Democrats lagged with a more
modest $1.5 million program. In 1998, however, the role of party independent spending declined.
The Democrats again committed $1.5 million (or about 7% of their combined total of
contributions to and spending in support of candidates) to independent expenditures, but
Republican party spending dropped to under $300,000.24 The parties’ apparent disinterest in
exploiting the opportunities for independent spending appears to be attributable to the emergence
of another, more attractive means of providing unlimited support for party candidates -- the use of
party soft money to finance so-called “issue advocacy.”25 
(2) Soft Money:  Party contributions to candidates, party coordinated expenditures with
26 In 1996, fifteen states placed no limits on individual contributions and eighteen states
placed no limits on PAC contributions. Some states with contribution ceilings use higher limits
than FECA. Eight states had no limits on corporate contributions and twelve states had no limits
on union contributions. Michael J. Malbin & Thomas L. Gais, THE DAY AFTER REFORM:
SOBERING CAMPAIGN FINANCE LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN STATES 16-17 (1999). 
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candidates, party grass-roots expenditures, and even the party independent expenditures
unleashed in Colorado Republican all involve so-called “hard money,” that is, money that
complies with the dollar limits and source prohibitions of FECA. Money for those activities must
abide by FECA’s restrictions because those activities involve express support of the election or
defeat of federal candidates and, thus, fall within the Act’s definitions of “contributions” and
“expenditures.” But increasingly party participation in federal elections is financed by so-called
“soft money,” that is, money that does not comply with FECA. This includes individual or PAC
donations in excess of the Act’s dollar limits, and corporate or union donations forbidden by
FECA. “Soft money” funds activities that affect federal elections but, due to statutory definition,
administrative action, or judicial decisions, technically fall outside FECA’s scope.
Soft money emerged out of the complications of political federalism. FECA regulates only
federal elections, but federal and state elections typically occur concurrently, with candidates for
federal and state offices appearing on one state ballot. Party committees can and do undertake
campaign efforts that assist their federal and state candidates simultaneously. Spending on federal
candidates must satisfy FECA, but aid to state candidates is subject only to state law. Many state
campaign finance laws are less restrictive than FECA: Some permit corporations or unions to
support candidates; some do not limit individual or PAC donations.26 
In the late 1970s, some state party committees began to press the FEC to allow them to
use funds that do not comply with FECA to finance part of the cost of campaign efforts that help
27 FEC Adv. Op’n 1978-10. Earlier FEC rulings had provided that only hard money could
be used to cover the costs of state party voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives intended to
benefit both state and federal candidates. See FEC Adv. Op’n 1976-72; FEC Adv. Op’n 1976-83. 
28 FEC Adv. Op’n 1979-17.
29 Prior to 1990, the FEC did not require the parties to report on their soft money
accounts, so the numbers in text are only estimates. See Herbert E. Alexander & Monica Bauer,
FINANCING THE 1988 ELECTION 37 (1991).
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the party ticket as a whole, including both federal and state candidates. The FEC in 1978
determined that a state party could use funds impermissible under FECA to defray the nonfederal
portion of  administrative overhead and of the costs of some activities  -- such as voter
registration and voter mobilization -- that directly benefit both federal and state candidates.27 In
1979, the FEC decided that national party committees could also set up accounts for the deposit
and disbursement of funds otherwise barred by FECA to pay for spending in support of  the
nonfederal portion of the combined federal-state ticket.28 Soft money was born.
Soft money grew during the 1980s, rising from $19 million in 1980 to $45 million in
1988.29 Soft money was used to build the infrastructure of the national parties – to hire staff,
acquire office space, develop direct mail capability, run polling and issues research operations,
acquire data processing equipment, and create and improve facilities for mass media
communications -- on the theory that since some portion of these activities is aimed at state and
local elections, a portion of the cost could be defrayed by nonfederal money. The national parties
also transferred millions of dollars in soft money to state parties to build their infrastructures, and
especially to fund shared voter mobilization programs such as direct mail campaigns and phone
bank operations intended to bring voters to the polls.  
In 1990, the FEC responded to years of prodding by campaign finance reformers and the
30 11 C.F.R. § 106.5.
31 Anthony Corrado, Party Soft Money 175 in Anthony Corrado, et al, CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK (1997). Even the FEC has acknowledged “there are . . .
indications that the allocation rules themselves may have increased the amount of soft money
raised by the national party committees.” FEC, Proposed Rules, “Prohibited and Excessive
Contribution; ‘Soft Money,’” 63 Fed. Reg. 37722, 37724, July 13, 1998.
32 FEC, “Political Party Fundraising Continues to Climb,” January 26, 1999,
http://www.fec.gov/press/pty3098.htm. 
33 FEC, “FEC Reports on Political Party Activity for 1997-98,” April 9, 1999,
http://www.fec.gov/press/ptyye98.htm (visited 10/25/99).
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courts, and issued rules, which became effective in 1991, requiring party committees to report
their soft money receipts, expenditures, and transfers, and regulating the allocation of expenses
for shared activities between federal and nonfederal accounts.30 The rules limited the ability of
party committees to shelter some funds for shared expenses in nonfederal accounts, but  “[t]he
general effect of the guidelines was . . . to give party organizations a clearer sense of how to
spend soft money legally, and, at least in some instances, to permit them . . . to pay a greater share
of their costs with soft money than they had been before.”31
Soft money exploded in the 1990s. In 1991-92, the two national parties raised $86 million
in soft money, or double the amount for 1987-88. Soft money accounted for approximately 17%
of total national party receipts in the 1992 election cycle.32 By 1995-96, national party soft money
receipts had trebled to $263.5 million, and accounted for 30% of total national party income. In
1997-98, the soft money share of national party income rose to 33% although actual party soft
money receipts declined to $224.4 million with the cyclical drop in fund-raising from a
presidential to a nonpresidential election.33 National party soft money receipts in 1997-98,
however, were nearly five times the $45 million in soft money receipts in 1993-94, the prior
34 The data on party hard money receipts in 1993-94 comes from “FEC Reports on
Political Party Activity for 1997-98,” supra. The data on soft money for that year is from FEC
Info/Public Disclosure, Inc., “Soft Money Summary (issued 12/28/98),”
http://www.tray.com/fecinfo/_smrpt.htm (visited 11/17/99).
35 FEC, “FEC Releases Fundraising Figures of Major Political Parties -- Large Gain in
‘Soft Money’ Contributions,” September 22, 1999 (Republicans raised 42% more in soft money
during the first six months of 1999, compared to the first six months of 1997, and Democrats
raised 93% more in the first half of 1999, compared to the first half of 1997. By contrast, party
hard money receipts were up only 16% compared to 1997).
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nonpresidential election, and more than treble the 10% soft money share of party receipts in 1993-
94.34 The 1997-98 election marked the first time in which soft money played a critical role in
congressional elections; in previous years, the primary use of soft money had been to enable
presidential candidates participating in the public funding system to evade the spending limits that
are a condition for the provision of public funds. Preliminary figures for the 1999-2000 election
cycle indicate the dollar volume of soft money is continuing to grow.35
The growth in soft money and its expansion into congressional races  reflects two
developments. First, there is now a substantial number of donors of very large soft money
contributions. In 1997-1998, there were 390 individuals or organizations -- including business
corporations, labor unions, Indian tribes, and ideological groups -- that gave $100,000 or more to
the soft money accounts of the national political parties. This number of $100,000+ donors 
reflected a 113% increase from 1993-94, the prior nonpresidential election cycle. Twenty-six
donors gave $500,000 or more; the top four donors gave more than $1 million each.  Corporate
contributions – prohibited by FECA –  dominated the soft money growth, with 218 corporations
giving more than $100,000 in 1997-98, and sixteen corporations giving more than $500,000 in
that period. In the prior nonpresidential election cycle, only 96 corporations broke the $100,000
36 FEC Info/Public Disclosure, Inc., “Soft Money Summary (issued 12/28/98),”
http://www.tray.com/fecinfo/_smrpt.htm (visited 11/17/99).
37 424 U.S. at 44, 79-80.
38 See Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77 Tex.
L. Rev. 1751, 1751 (1999) (discussing issue advertisement that focused on candidate’s personal
character not issues).
39 See id. at 1754-59.
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mark, and only four gave more than $250,000.  Thirty-five trade associations also gave $100,000
or more in soft money in 1997-98. Wealthy individuals or couples provided most of the other
large soft money donations, with 114 individuals or husband-and-wife pairs giving $100,000 or
more, 26 individuals or couples giving $250,000 or more, and four giving $500,000 or more.36
Second, the parties have discovered a major new use for soft money – to finance so-called
“issue advocacy” advertising. The concept of issue advocacy grew out of the Supreme Court’s
effort in Buckley to prevent FECA from unconstitutionally curtailing the discussion of political
ideas and issues. The Court construed FECA to apply only to “expenditures for communications
that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.”37 Such
expenditures is known in campaign finance jargon as “express advocacy;” all other political
communications are called “issue advocacy,” although many so-called “issue ads” do not discuss
issues at all.38  Influenced by a footnote in Buckley, most of the lower federal courts that have
considered whether a particular ad constitutes express or issue advocacy have applied the so-
called “magic words” test, limiting the definition of express advocacy  -- and the scope of FECA
regulation -- to communications that literally ask voters to “vote for,” “elect,” “cast your ballot
for, “vote against,” or “defeat” a candidate.39 Ads that effectively advocate or oppose the cause of
40 See id. at 1759-60.
41 FEC Adv. Op’n 1995-25.
42 See Robert Biersack & Melanie Haskell, Spitting on the Umpire: Political Parties, the
Federal Election Campaign Act, and the 1996 Campaigns, in Green, supra, at 177.
43 Deborah Beck, et al, ISSUE ADVOCACY ADVERTISING DURING THE 1996 CAMPAIGN 3,
34, 55 (1997).
44 See Paul S. Herrnson, Financing the 1996 Congressional Elections, in Green, supra, at
122 (DNC and the Democratic congressional committees spent $60 million on issue ads in 1995-
96, while the RNC and Republican congressional committees spent $49 million). 
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a candidate but do not use the magic words avoid FECA’s restrictions and requirements.40
Unlike soft money, issue ads until the mid-1990s were largely initially the province of
nonparty groups, particularly ideological organizations.  In 1995, the Federal Election
Commission (“FEC”) determined that the Republican National Committee (“RNC”) could use
soft money to defray  part of the costs of advertising that combined discussion of issues with
criticism of President Clinton by name.41 In the 1996 elections, both parties extensively utilized
issue ads.  The Democratic National Committee (“DNC”) undertook a multimillion dollar
advertising program to trumpet the accomplishments of the Clinton administration and criticize
the Republican Congress without explicitly calling for the election or defeat of particular
candidates. So, too, the RNC spent millions to pay for issue ads in support of the Dole campaign.
These party issue ads effectively eviscerated the presidential public funding spending limits.42 
One early study estimated that the parties spent $68 million on issue ads in the 1996
election cycle,43 thereby accounting for nearly half of all issue ad spending in that election.
Another scholar  recently estimated major party issue ad spending in 1995-96 at nearly $110
million.44 In the 1997-98 election cycle party issue ad spending was between $90 million and $110
45 Jeffrey D. Stanger & Douglas G. Rivlin, ISSUE ADVOCACY ADVERTISING DURING THE
1997-1998 ELECTION CYCLE 2-4 (1998).
46 Party coordinated and independent expenditures in the 1996 presidential election came
to $19.2 million. See Anthony Corrado, Financing the 1996 Presidential General Election, in
Green, supra, at 75.  Party contributions to candidates, coordinated expenditures, and
independent expenditures in the 1996 congressional elections came to $70.9 million. See
Biersack & Haskell, supra, in id. at 163. Total party contributions to, coordinated expenditures
with, and independent expenditures concerning federal candidates in 1997-98 came to $40.8
million. See FEC, “Political Party Fundraising Continues to Climb,” January 26, 1999,
http://www/fec/gov/press/pty3098.htm (visited 9/17/99).
47 11 C.F.R. § 106.5(b)(2).
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million.45 Party issue ad spending is now comparable to, and possibly greater than, the total of 
party spending in donations to candidates, coordinated spending, and independent spending.46
With their exploitation of  issue advocacy, the parties have vastly expanded their ability to
use soft money. No longer limited to building infrastructure or to efforts ostensibly aimed at
nonfederal candidates, soft money can now be deployed directly to pay for ads that aid their
federal candidates. Rapidly growing soft money collections -- increasingly solicited by federal
officials, led by President Clinton -- and the expansive new use for soft money dramatically
reinforced each other over the last two election cycles. 
The FEC’s 1995 advisory opinion imposed one important limit on the use of soft money to
fund issue advocacy: The opinion  provided that party issue advocacy costs are subject to the
FEC regulations that provide for the allocation of mixed federal-nonfederal activity between hard
and soft money. Under these rules, national party issue advocacy spending must be funded  60%
by hard money and 40% by soft money in nonpresidential election years, and 65% by hard money
and 35% by soft money in presidential election years.47 For state parties, the hard/soft allocation is
48As there are typically far more state than federal offices up for election in any given state,
the state parties may fund most of their issue advocacy spending with soft money. To take
advantage of this, the national party committees transferred tens of millions of dollars of soft
money to the state parties, so that the latter could use their greater soft money allocation to pay
for issue ads and other shared federal-nonfederal expenses.  See  Jill Abramson & Leslie Wayne,
“Democrats Used the State Parties to Bypass Limits,” N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1997, at A1; Robert
Biersack & Melanie Haskell, Spitting on the Umpire: Political Parties, the Federal Election
Campaign Act, and the 1996 Campaigns, in Green, supra, at 179-181. 
49  Republican National Committee v FEC, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 28505, D.C. Cir., Nov.
6, 1998 (affirming district court order denying preliminary injunction against application of FEC
soft money allocation regulation to party issue advocacy expenditures).
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based on the federal share of the total number of federal and state offices on the state ballot. 48 In
1998, however, two party committees sued the FEC, asserting that issue advocacy is entirely
beyond the scope of FECA, so that any limit on the use of soft money to fund issue advocacy is
unconstitutional. The parties failed to obtain injunctive relief in time for the 1998 elections,49 but
the suit is still pending. If the party committees prevail, party issue advocacy is likely to surge, and
with it, the demand for party soft money.
II. Party Money and the Buckley Doctrine
A. Constitutional Challenges to Regulating Party Money
Together party independent spending, party soft money, and party issue advocacy have
undermined many of the basic elements of FECA – the dollar and source limits on campaign
contributions, the limits on party support for candidates, and the spending limits on coordinated
expenditures that are built into the presidential public funding system. These same practices would
be equally subversive of any public funding program Congress might adopt for congressional
elections, and of state-level public funding initiatives for state elections. 
50 424 U.S. at 46-47.
51 518 U.S. at 613-23.
52 424 U.S. at 41-44, 76-80. See also FEC v Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479
U.S. 238, 248-50 (1986).
53 The ads in Colorado Republican was arguably issue advocacy since they criticized a
candidate’s record but did not expressly call for his defeat. Indeed, the district court held that the
ads were not express advocacy. FEC v Colorado Republican Fed. Camp. Comm., 839 F. Supp.
1448, 1455 (D. Colo. 1993). The Tenth Circuit held that the ad contained an “electioneering
message” within the meaning of an FEC advisory opinion that provided that such messages by 
parties are subject to FECA’s limits on coordinated spending. FEC v Colorado Republican Fed.
Camp. Comm., 59 F.3d 1015, 1021-22 (10th Cir. 1995). The circuit court suggested that the
concept of express advocacy could be interpreted more broadly when applied to party speech, but
its opinion also assumed that parties are incapable of engaging in independent expenditures. The
latter assumption was, of course, reversed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not
discuss whether the Colorado Republican ad might be issue advocacy. 
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It is uncertain whether these practices may be effectively curtailed consistent with the
Buckley doctrine. The distinction between coordinated spending – which is treated as a
contribution and may be subject to limitation – and independent spending -- which is immune from
limitation -- is a central element of Buckley.50 Moreover, in Colorado Republican a Supreme
Court plurality specifically determined that parties are capable of independent spending and that
such party spending is entitled to the same constitutional protection as independent spending by
individuals or PACs.51 The line between express advocacy and issue advocacy, is central to
Buckley,52 and there is nothing in the Court’s campaign finance cases indicating that party issue
ads are less protected than the issue ads of other organizations.53 
At first blush, any constitutional challenge to the imposition of limits on soft money would
appear unlikely to succeed. Soft money involves contributions to the parties, rather than spending
by the parties, and a central element of Buckley, most recently reconfirmed by Nixon v Shrink
54 120 S.Ct. 897 (2000).
55 See Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990); FEC v National
Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
56 Bradley A. Smith, Soft Money, Hard Realities: The Constitutional Prohibition of a Soft
Money Ban, 24 J. LEGIS. 179, 196-99 (1998). In February 2000, President Clinton nominated
Professor Smith to be a member of the Federal Election Commission.
57 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
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Missouri Government PAC,54 is that contributions present special dangers of corruption that
warrant limitation. Moreover, the principal providers of soft money are corporations and the
Court has specifically upheld bans on the use of corporate treasury funds in candidate elections.55 
The constitutionality of limits on soft money, however, is open to attack. First, Professor
Bradley A. Smith has argued that soft money used to fund issue advocacy is constitutionally
exempt from limitation since issue advocacy is, by definition, political speech immune from
regulation.56 Second, going beyond issue advocacy, the case for limiting soft money donations to
the parties assumes there is something corrupting about party spending. In Citizens Against Rent
Control v City of Berkeley,57 the Court held unconstitutional an ordinance restricting donations to
committees that support or oppose ballot propositions because the Court had previously
determined that spending on ballot propositions raised no possibility of corruption (as there was
no candidate to corrupt). If party spending cannot corrupt, contributions to parties may not be
limited.  In fact, several members of the Supreme Court in Colorado Republican have denied that
party support for candidates presents a danger of corruption within the meaning of Buckley.
Instead of joining the plurality and protecting the party ads in that case as independent
expenditures, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas would have
58 518 U.S. at 626-31 (opinion of Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); 644-48 (opinion of Justice
Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part).
59 FEC v Colorado Republican Fed. Camp. Comm., 41 F.Supp.2d 1197 (D. Colo. 1999).
21
invalidated FECA’s limits on party coordinated expenditures.58 On remand, a district judge did
exactly that.59 Although these opinions focused on the coordinated spending limits, they would
logically apply to the limits on party contributions to candidates – since both FECA and Buckley
treat coordinated expenditures and contributions as legally equivalent – and, ultimately, perhaps
to the limits on contributions to the parties.
Strikingly, the constitutional challenges to limits on party money flow from diametrically
opposing visions of the parties and of the relationships among parties, candidates, and PACs. 
On the one hand, the defense of party independent spending and party issue advocacy
assumes a sharp separation of the parties from their candidates. If a party committee functioned as
a candidate’s campaign organization, then all spending by that committee, whether or not
technically coordinated with a candidate would be considered coordinated spending. Similarly, if a
party committee was an arm of the candidate’s campaign organization then all its advertising,
even the ads without the magic words of express advocacy would be express advocacy for
constitutional purposes much as all expenditures by a candidate are considered to be express
advocacy even if the candidate’s ads do not say “vote for me” or “vote against my opponent.”
Strong constitutional protection of such activity assumes that parties are sharply distinct from
their candidates, and, instead, are very much like all other campaign intermediaries. In short, the
argument against limits on party independent spending and party issue advocacy assumes that
60 518 U.S. at 613-23.
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parties are like PACs, and are entitled to the same protections afforded to PACs. 
On the other hand, the challenge to the constitutionality of limits on direct party support
for candidates – and, the implicit challenge to limits on donations to parties – assumes that parties
are quite different from other campaign finance intermediaries. The differences between PACs and
parties are said to eliminate the possibility that party participation in campaigns present a danger
of corruption.
Both critiques of limiting party money cannot be right. Indeed, I believe both are wrong.
Although, as noted in Part I, FECA to some extent models its regulation of parties on its
treatment of PACs, the major political parties are not PACs. Mechanically applying to the parties
constitutional distinctions developed with PACs in mind makes little sense and is a recipe for
wholesale evasion of the campaign finance laws. Moreover, party money does present dangers of
corruption. Party fundraising practices link up private donors, party committees, and candidates
and officeholders in ways that directly implicate the anti-corruption concerns that Buckley placed
at the center of our campaign finance regime.
B. The Constitutionality of Curbing Party Money
(1) Party Spending and the Limits of the PAC Model: The principal decision illustrating
the parties-as-PACs model is the plurality opinion of Justice Breyer, joined by Justices O’Connor
and Souter, in Colorado Republican, which found that party committee spending, like PAC
spending, can be subject to limits only if it is in fact coordinated with a candidate’s campaign.60
61 See id. at 615 (citing Buckley and FEC v National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985)(“NCPAC”).
62 Id.
63 William Crotty, Political Parties in the 1996 Election: The Party as Team or the
Candidates as Superstars?, 203 in Maisel, supra.  See also Paul S. Herrnson, PARTY
CAMPAIGNING IN THE 1980S 8 (1988) (“the principal aim of American political parties has always
been to elect candidates to public office”).
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Relying on earlier cases that had invalidated limits on independent expenditures by PACs,61 the
plurality could “not see how a provision that limits a political party’s independent expenditures
can escape their controlling effect.”62 
But the reasons for constitutional protection for PAC or individual spending are not
implicated by spending by party committees. First, individuals and organizations participating in a
campaign may have interests other than, or in addition to, the election of the candidate they are
backing or the defeat of the candidate they are attacking. They may wish to use their expenditures
to highlight an issue in order to send a message -- or to use the voters to send a message -- on
that issue. It may be as important to them to make the election a referendum on abortion, or to
emphasize that their opposition to a candidate stems from her position on term limits, as to
express a position on which candidate should be elected. Their critical issues may include matters 
candidates prefer to ignore. Indeed, by airing certain messages an independent committee’s
advertising may be at odds with the campaign strategy of the very candidate it is backing. 
The major parties, by contrast, do not have an electoral agenda other than election of their
candidates. “The defining mission focus of political parties in the contemporary era is to elect
candidates to office.”63 Major party advertising expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
candidate -- which is the type of advertising funded by independent spending -- is not intended to
64 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
65 424 U.S. at 47, 470 U.S. at 498.
66 See, e.g., Herrnson, Financing 1996 Congressional Elections in Green, supra, at 100.
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raise issues that differ from those advanced by the party’s candidates, or to elect candidates with a
particular policy mandate. Its goal is, simply, to elect candidates affiliated with the party. 
Second, Buckley found, and FEC v National Conservative Political Action Committee
(“NCPAC”)64 reiterated, that independent expenditures raise little danger of a candidate-financial
supporter quid pro quo, which is the constitutional basis for the power to restrict contributions,
because the “absence of prearrangement and coordination undermines the value of the
expenditure to the candidate.”65 This might be true for an independent expenditure by an
individual or interest group that is institutionally distinct from the candidate. In the absence of an
ongoing relationship between candidate and independent supporter, the supporter’s advertising
could hit the wrong themes, or be redundant rather than supplement candidate spending.  But
there will typically be preexisting ties between the party organization and the candidate who holds
the party’s nomination, between the party staff and the campaign staff, or between the consultants
retained by the party and by the candidate. Even where such ties are lacking the party
organization’s history of involvement with candidates seeking office means its spending is likely to
be quite valuable to the candidate even without formal coordination with the candidate. 
Party committees frequently aid candidates in hiring campaign managers, consultants,
media and pollsters, so that parties and their committees often engage the services of the same
political professionals. Party committees  provide their candidates with issue and opposition
research and poll and focus group data, and they assist candidates with their fundraising.66 Party
67 See Jonathan Bernstein and Raymond J. LaRaja, Independent Expenditures and
Partisanship in House Elections (Paper prepared for delivery at 1999 Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, Sept. 2-5, 1999).
68 63 F. Supp.2d 1008 (D. Minn. 1999).
69 Id. at 1012.
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committees and candidates share pollsters, campaign strategists, and media consultants, and
campaign professionals shuttle back and forth among party committees, candidate committees,
and consulting firms. Even when they do not sit down to discuss the placement or content of a
specific ad, parties and their candidates are structurally integrated, not independent.67
The ability of parties to combine a close structural relationship with a candidate while
maintaining the notional independence of a particular advertising campaign is nicely illustrated by
the recent federal district court decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v Pauly.68 The
Minnesota Republican Party provided state candidates with “‘meaningful and helpful’ service and
‘direct support;” kept in “‘close contact’ with ‘elected officials and statewide campaigns,”
“‘work[ed] directly with Republican candidates on issue research,’ ‘develop[ed] campaign plans,’
and ‘manage[d] the scheduling of candidate and party activity.’” On “numerous occasions”
candidates who had been endorsed by the party attended party fundraisers, and the party
encouraged its candidates to attend biweekly “coordinating meetings” at party headquarters. The
party also made direct contributions to its candidates.69  But when the party took out its own
advertising in support of its nominees, the party officials responsible for the ads avoided direct
contact with the candidates. As a result, the party’s ads were considered to be independent
expenditures, not subject to limitation. Although the district court found the “record in this case is
replete with examples of cooperation,”there was no evidence of “actual coordination” of the
70 Id. at 1017.
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particular expenditures in question with candidates.70
Certainly, parties are organizationally distinct from their candidates, and it is technically
possible, as Colorado Republican suggested, for a party committee to support a candidate by
engaging in spending that is not coordinated with the candidate’s campaign. But the party’s
relationship to its candidate is far different from that between a PAC and a candidate it is backing.
The party includes its candidate. The candidate is typically a member of the party, has been active
in the party, and, once nominated, ultimately bears the party label, uses the party’s place on the
ballot, and necessarily benefits from the loyalty and support of party activists. Candidates are far
more tightly linked to their parties than to they are to other politically active organizations that
may engage in independent spending. 
But, as Pauly reveals, the notion of party independent spending is disconnected from the
actual relationships among parties and candidates. Given the structural integration shared
institutional interests of parties and candidates, the notion of independent party spending makes
little sense. Certainly, the notion of independence should be construed far more narrowly, and the
presumption of coordination should be far stronger, when party spending is at issue.
Similar concerns are implicated by the application of the express advocacy/issue advocacy
distinction to the parties. As previously noted, the express advocacy/issue advocacy distinction
grows out of the Court’s recognition that some doctrinal means is needed to permit regulation of
election-related spending while preserving the fundamental First Amendment norm of  immunizing
non-election-related political speech from regulation. The line the Court drew between express
advocacy and all other political speech reflects the desire for a test that is both crisp -- thereby
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avoiding vagueness and the chilling effect that can result from vague regulation -- and narrow,
thus, minimizing any interference with other political speech. 
The particular distinction the Court adopted between “express advocacy” and other
speech may make sense with respect to individuals and groups, such as PACs, that participate in
politics in order to advance certain issue agendas, protect certain organizations, or affect public
policy. For them, election-related activity may be only one of a number of techniques -- including
legislative lobbying, the use of op-eds and the dissemination of think tank research to opinion
leaders, advertising aimed at influencing public opinion more generally, or grass-roots level
organizing concerning their issues – for affecting the political process. Some narrow definition of
election-related speech is necessary to protect these other forms of political speech and activity,
which can have indirect effects on elections, from the constraints of FECA. The narrow express
advocacy test enables them to link the discussion of political issues and policy goals with
references to particular elected officials and candidates without fearing that they will be subject to
the reporting requirements and contribution and spending rules of FECA.
But the major political parties, particularly the national and congressional campaign
committees, are quite different from other politically active groups. Party committee spending is
aimed almost exclusively at the election of party candidates to office and thereby holding or
winning power. This is not to say that the major parties have no interest in ideology at all, or that
they do not have the same right as other organizations to discuss issues. The two great national
parties were founded for ideological reasons, and contemporary party activists often have strong
ideological bents. No doubt many people who choose to become active in party organizations do
so in the belief that by helping their party to win power they are advancing their own views on
71 Joe & Wilcox in Green, supra, at 61.
72 Biersack & Haskell, supra, in id. at 177.
73 Paul S. Herrnson & Diana Dwyre, Party Issue Advocacy in Congressional Election
Campaigns, in Green & Shea, supra, at 98.
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policy issues. Party spending that is exclusively about issues is entitled to the same constitutional
protection that applies to spending on politics by other groups or individuals. But most party
spending is aimed at electing party candidates. When PACs and other politically active groups
combine discussions of issues and candidates, it may not be clear whether they are doing so to
advance their issues agenda or elect candidates, but when parties couple issue discussions with
references to candidates their goal is almost certainly the election of their candidates. 
Indeed, in the last two election cycles, the content of party issue advertising was often
indistinguishable from party express advocacy ads and from the candidates’ own ads. “Some of
the Democratic Party issue ads that helped Bill Clinton in 1995 used the same film clips and some
of the same voiceovers as the Clinton campaign ads – indeed, they were distinguishable only by
their failure to call explicitly for the president’s reelection.”71 Some ads that appeared in 1996
were run both as “express” ads paid for by the presidential campaigns and as “issue” ads paid for
by party committees. “With the exception of a ‘tag’ line, these ads were exactly the same.”72  A
content analysis of party issue ads and candidate ads in one 1996 Senate race found that the ads
were quite similar.  Both candidate and party issue ads contained discussions of campaign issues,
with “only small differences in the extent to which candidate ads and party ads highlight issues.”73
Both candidate and party issue ads avoided use of the “magic words” of express advocacy and,
74 Id. at 94-96. Both candidates and parties appear to have absorbed a central lesson of
modern advertising, that indirect appeals can be far more effective than direct exhortation to buy a
product. As Justice Ann Walsh Bradley of the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently observed, “Few
advertisements will directly say ‘Buy Nike rather than Reebok’ or ‘Drink Maxwell House coffee.’
Be they in the print or electronic media, advertisements normally do not include a call for action
or use ‘magic words’ to relay their message. Yet every reader, listener, or viewer knows that
‘Less filling, tastes great’ is an unambiguous exhortation to purchase a particular type of Miller
beer. And ‘They’re Gr-r-reat’ is Tony the Tiger’s unambiguous appeal to buy a box of sugar-
coated corn flakes.” Elections Board of Wisconsin v Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, 597
N.W.2d 721, 742-43 (Wisc. 1999).
75 Herrnson & Dwyre, supra, at 99.
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instead made only subtle or indirect references, if any references at all, to the upcoming election.74
Both candidate and party issue ads used the same visual and audio production techniques. Party
ads used “slow-motion, black–and-white, blurry footage,” and “grainy and fearful images” of 
candidates of the other party, and sought to link those candidates visually with undesirable
groups, like criminals or gang members. “The use of such a technique by the parties in issue
advocacy ads gives those ads a distinctly campaign-like flavor, further confirming their intent to
influence the outcome of an election rather than merely to educate voters about some policy
issue.”75
Party issue ad spending is, in practice, not a means for politically active, independent
citizens to increase the discussion of issues in public life, but rather an integral part of  candidate-
election strategies. Both Democratic and Republican parties, working with their  candidates, use
issue advocacy to avoid the spending limits on publicly funded presidential candidates and on
coordinated expenditures for Congressional candidates, and to spend money obtained in
contributions that violate FECA’s restrictions. In reports released in the fall of 1998, FEC
auditors found that the DNC and the Clinton-Gore ’96 campaign had worked together on the
76 See FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N, REPORT OF THE AUDIT DIVISION ON CLINTON-GORE
’96 PRIMARY COMMITTEE, INC. 24 (1998).
77 Id. at 108.
78 See FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N, REPORT OF THE AUDIT DIVISION ON THE DOLE FOR
PRESIDENT COMMITTEE, INC. (PRIMARY) 16, 34-36, 46 (1998).
79 David Magleby & Marianne Holt, Party Money in 1998 Congressional Elections, in
DAVID B. MAGLEBY & MARIANNE HOLT, OUTSIDE MONEY: SOFT MONEY AND ISSUE ADS IN
COMPETITIVE 1998 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, A REPORT OF A GRANT FUNDED BY THE PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS (1999) at 19.
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production and placement of television ads paid for by the DNC, and that the party and the
candidates’ committee shared a standard form memorandum for authorization of production and
purchase of air time for media advertising: “One section of this memorandum states ‘The cost will
be allocate a ___% for the DNC and ___% for Clinton-Gore ’96.’  The next line states ‘attorneys
to determine.’”76 The FEC general counsel found that it was “difficult to distinguish between the
activities of the DNC and the [Clinton] Primary Committee with respect to the creation and
publication of the media advertisements at issue.”77 FEC auditors also found that the RNC paid
more than $18 million directly and through Republican state committees on behalf of the Dole
campaign for ads that were aired between April and August 1996 – a period in which Dole was
bumping up against the spending ceiling he had accepted as a condition for receiving public
funding.78 In 1998, party issue ads “reinforced the themes and messages of their candidates.”
When skillfully done, issue ads demonstrated “seamless party/candidate communication” on such
topics as taxes, drugs, and education. “This consistency assisted voters [to] remember the
candidate’s agenda.”79
To be sure, some advertising broadcast or published by party committees can be just about
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issues. Such speech must be protected from governmental regulation. But, as with the
coordinated/independent distinction, the intensive focus of party spending on election campaigns
and the close, ongoing institutional connection between party candidates and party campaign
committees suggests that in the party context, Buckley’s goal of protecting issue speech may be
vindicated with an election-related/issue speech distinction that defines election-related speech
more broadly than would be constitutionally acceptable for speech by PACs or politically active
individuals. Such a shift is necessary if the other goals of campaign finance law – restrictions on
large donations, the prohibition on corporate and union contributions, the spending ceilings that
are part of public funding – are to be protected from the issue advocacy end-run around FECA.
(2) Parties and Corruption: The Contributor-Party-Candidate Relationship: Potentially, the
far more serious constitutional objection to regulating party money is the claim that parties do not
present any danger of corruption. Under the view of parties-as-PACs, party coordinated
expenditures could be limited and express advocacy would have to be funded by hard money. But
if party money presents no danger of corruption,  there would be no basis for limiting either
donations to parties or the financial support provided by parties to their candidates.  
The argument that parties are not corrupting has two components. The first is that due to
the tight ties linking a party to its candidates -- the very ties that distinguish parties from PACs
and make the notion of party independent spending so implausible -- parties can not have a
corrupting influence on their candidates.  This argument is theoretically shaky, but may be right in
practice. The second recognizes that parties get their money from private donors who may
attempt to channel money through the parties to candidates in order to evade FECA’s limits on
direct donations to candidates, but arguments that due to the variety of interests in a party and the
80 Colorado Republican, supra, 518 U.S. at 630 (Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
81 See id. (citing Buckley’s invalidation of FECA’s limits on candidate’s campaign
expenditures, 424 U.S. at 54-59).
82 Id.
83 424 U.S. at 53.
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large number of donors to the party, any corruptive potential is diluted away. This argument is
attractive in theory but is seriously undermined by current campaign finance practices. 
(a) Party Influence Over Candidates: A strong version of the argument that a party is
incapable of corrupting its candidates was articulated by Justice Kennedy in his Colorado
Republican separate opinion. Justice Kennedy claimed there is “a practical identity of interests”
between party and candidate such that party spending in support of a candidate, including
spending that is coordinated with the candidate, “is indistinguishable from expenditures by the
candidate or his campaign committee.”80 Limiting party support for its candidate would be like
limiting the candidate’s own campaign spending – which Buckley held to be unconstitutional.81 As
“[t]he party’s form of organization and the fact that its fate in an election is inextricably
intertwined with that of its candidates,”82 a party could no more corrupt its candidates than it
could corrupt itself. Limiting party support for candidates, then, would also be like limiting a
candidate’s ability to use her personal wealth to fund her campaign. Buckley, however, invalidated
the FECA provision that would have limited candidates’ use of personal funds precisely because
the latter presented no danger of corruption.83
A less extreme version of this argument was advanced by Justice Thomas, writing for
himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, in their separate opinion in Colorado
84 518 U.S. at 646.
85 FEC v Democratic Sen. Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 42 (1981).
86 FEC v Colorado Rep. Fed. Camp. Comm., 41 F. Supp.2d 1197, 1212 (D. Colo. 1999).
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Republican. Justice Thomas who argued that even if a party committee uses its funds to influence
a candidate there is nothing wrong – nothing “corrupting” -- about that.  “The very aim of a
political party is to influence its candidate’s stance on issues and, if the candidate takes office or is
reelected, his votes.” A party’s exercise of influence over its candidates and officeholders is not
“‘subversion of the political process’” but “successful advocacy of ideas in the political
marketplace and representative government in a party system.”84 
Other judges have expressly similar views about the positive effects of party influence on
candidates. In 1981, a unanimous Supreme Court, in upholding the validity of  party agency
agreements, observed approvingly that such agreements could lead to a more effective use of
party resources in support of party candidates, which “may encourage candidate loyalty and
responsiveness to the party.”85 In striking FECA’s caps on coordinated spending in the Colorado
Republican remand, Judge Nottingham concluded that party use of coordinated expenditures to
influence candidates could not be viewed as “an attempt to exert improper influence.”86
Many political scientists also emphasize the benefits of greater party influence over
candidates. They argued that greater party cohesion could facilitate concerted action across the
separate branches of government and make the party labels on candidates more meaningful to the
voters. This would make it easier for voters to judge the record of the party in power, compare
the programs of competing parties, and cast ballots based on policies rather than candidate
personalities. Indeed, a group of distinguished political scientists, writing as the Committee for
87 Colorado Republican, Amicus Brief for Committee for Party Renewal, 1996 WL 75770
at *16.
88 See, e.g., Epstein, supra, at 155-56 (describing the direct primary as the
“institutionalized means” of pursuing politics in “a civic culture that is broadly hostile to party
organizational control”).
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Party Renewal, submitted an amicus brief in Colorado Republican urging that “political party
support is not corruptive.”87
The argument that parties, by definition, cannot corrupt their candidates is debatable in
theory. Certainly, Justice Kennedy notwithstanding, parties and candidates are not literally
identical. Party committees and candidates can differ over campaign strategies and policy issues.
Party committees, like other campaign donors could seek to leverage their funds to induce a
candidate to take certain positions on pending legislative issues, to harmonize her campaign with
national party themes, or even to hire certain campaign professionals. Party committees might try
to do this in order to attract more contributions and other forms of support for the party from
PACs, individuals, and politically active ideological or special interest groups. A national party
committee is concerned with a wide range of elections across the country, and with the securing
of power at the national level, rather than with any one candidate’s particular fate, so that the
party and the candidate in a particular could have divergent interests. 
Nor are party efforts to influence candidate issue positions necessarily normatively
desirable. There is a longstanding tradition in our political culture that looks at party organizations
and party bosses with skepticism, if not fear. From Madison’s condemnation of faction, to the
Progressive Era drive to use the primary to break the hold of party machines,88 to contemporary
public sentiments, caught in opinion polling, which indicate a preference for voting the candidate
89 See Martin P. Wattenberg, THE RISE OF CANDIDATE-CENTERED POLITICS:
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF THE 1980S 34 (1991) (“most pervasive is the belief that one should
vote for the candidate, not the party”). See also State v Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d
597, 626 (Ak. 1999) (“The natural tendency of successful candidates who receive unlimited
contributions from a party would be to reduce independent consideration of issues and adhere to
positions taken by the party itself.”).
90 518 U.S. at 648. Justice Stevens was joined by Justice Ginsburg. See also FEC v
National Rep. Sen. Comm., 761 F. Supp. 813, 821-22 & n.12 (D.D.C. 1991) (it is “entirely
plausible” that spending limits on party committees “serve[] the anti-corruption purposes
identified by Congress and approved by the Supreme Court in Buckley;”“Congress, by setting
contribution limits from the parties to candidates has apparently concluded that too much
responsiveness to the parties, if obtained by unrestricted contributions, is undesirable.”); rev’d on
other grounds, 966 F.2d 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
91 See ,e g., John H. Aldrich, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF
POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA 269-74 (1995) (describing the “rise of the party in service to its
candidates”); John F. Bibby, State Party Organizations: Coping and Adapting to Candidate-
Centered Politics and Nationalization, in Maisel, supra, at 24.
According to Frank Sorauf, “the party as funder rarely, if ever, asks questions of program
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and not the party,89 there is a strong commitment in the American system to the independence of
candidates and officeholders from party control. Justice Stevens, in his Colorado Republican
dissent, adverted to this when he voiced concern that  “the party -- or the persons who control the
party -- will abuse the influence it has over the candidate by virtue of its power to spend.”90 The
emergence of candidate-centered politics in the twentieth century is at least in part a reflection of
this popular sentiment and of institutional arrangements, such as the direct primary and the
primary open to nonparty voters, intended to implement that sentiment.
Still, in practice, those who argue that party money does not present a serious danger of 
undue party influence over candidates may be right. Studies of party campaign committees have
found that the parties strive not to influence or control their candidates but to serve them and
thereby help to elect them.91 A national party committee typically has  “little interest in ideological
or issue commitment of those it helps; the question is electability, not loyalty to party programs or
issue positions.” Sorauf, supra, at 241.
92 Robert G. Boatright, “You Don’t Know Me, but Here I Am”: Congressional
Candidates and Party Strength, 323 in Green & Shea, supra.
A study of  state legislative campaign committees (“LCCs”), too, found “there is little
evidence to suggest LCC  resources are used as a reward or punishment for legislative behavior.
DANIEL M. SHEA, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY: LEGISLATIVE CAMPAIGN COMMITTEES AND
POLITICAL PARTIES 29 (1995). Accord, GIERZYNSKI, supra, at 122 (“there is not attempt to
increase party cohesion by distributing resources on the bases of party loyalty or ideology”). 
93 This is nicely illustrated by the strategic advice the National Republican Campaign 
Committee gave to a Republican Congressional candidate in 1990 to vote against Republican
President Bush’s tax plan, and the assistance it gave to the House candidate in preparing ads that
highlighted the candidate’s opposition to his own party’s president. See Kolodny, supra, at 185.  
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‘litmus tests’ and instead provides assistance to candidates based on their chance of winning.
Candidate assistance is apportioned according to fulfillment by the candidates of nonpolicy
criteria, such as individual fund-raising levels and favorable polling numbers.”92 This candidate-
election focus of party organizations is connected to some of the central characteristics of
contemporary politics: the relative weakness of partisanship within the electorate, the closeness of
interparty conflict, and the increased salience of party within government. 
With party loyalty in the electorate declining, partisan control of the Presidency and
Congress up for grabs, and the determination of party control having a major impact on elected
officials, party organizations -- particularly the Senate and House campaign committees that are
actually composed of elected officials – are constrained to make winning, rather than ideological
purity their primary if not exclusive goal.93  Congressional party committees participate in
elections to protect or gain seats for their party in their legislative chamber so that the party can
control the organization of the chamber and the benefits over the control of committee
94 Cf. Phil Kuntz, Judge’s Doubts on Corporate-Contribution Ban Pose Latest Test for
Weakened Campaign Laws, WALL ST. J., January 13, 2000, at A24 (federal district court judge
suggests that ban on corporate contributions is unconstitutional because unregulated soft money
donations by corporations to parties has “‘essentially rendered the contributions and spending
limits . . . meaningless’”).
95 See, e.g., Frank J. Sorauf, What Buckley Wrought? in E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANTZ, ed.,  IF
BUCKLEY FELL: A FIRST AMENDMENT BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATING MONEY IN POLITICS 32
(1999).
In fact, many of the studies of state legislative campaign committees (“LCC’s”) that found
that these organizations focus almost exclusively on electability, not ideology or party loyalty,
involved LCCs in states in which there are no limits on party contributions to state legislative
candidates. In 1996, in 31 states, there were no limits on party contributions to candidates for the
lower house of the state legislature. See Malbin & Gais, supra, at 17-19.  
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assignments and the legislative agenda that such control brings. Their interest in legislative power
binds them far more tightly to their candidates than ideological affinity or voting records links
ideological groups to the candidates they back. Ideological groups can try to use their power to
grant or withhold funds to influence officeholder actions. But with the success of party
committees closely tied up with the election of  party candidates, it is unlikely -- as studies of
party committees show -- that these committees will use their funds to advance any goal other
than the electoral success of their candidates. 
To be sure, if the current limits on party spending were invalidated -- or the growing role
of party spending outside of FECA were to render the statutory limits completely irrelevant94 --
the potential for party organizations to exert influence over party officeholders might grow.95 But
at the moment, the danger that party officials will use their control over party campaign treasuries
to unduly influence party officeholders does not, by itself, seem sufficiently serious to justify limits
on party support for candidates. 
(b) Dilution or Concentration? Private Contributors, the Parties, and the Candidates: Party
96 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
97 453 U.S. 182, 197-98 (1981)(plurality opinion). See also id. at 202-04 (concurring
opinion of Justice Blackmun).
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committees raise their money from private donors. With relatively tight limits on direct donations
by individuals and PACs to candidates, donors could give money to the parties to circumvent
those limits, or to supplement the money that is given under the limits. The party could, in effect,
serve as a conduit for passing along contributions from private donors to candidates. 
In California Medical Association (“CalMed”) v FEC,96 the Supreme Court upheld
FECA’s limits on donations by a parent organization to its own PAC on just this theory. Surely,
there could be no stronger instance of donor-recipient identity, and no weaker case for donor-
recipient corruption, as under FECA, a parent organization is allowed to set policy for its PAC.
But the Court reasoned that although an organization’s donation to its own PAC presents no
danger of corruption in itself, if contributions by the organization to the PAC were unlimited the
organization might in effect give through its PAC in order to circumvent the limits on the
organization’s direct contributions to its candidate. Thus, contributions by an organization to its
PAC can be limited in order to “protect the integrity of the contribution limits” on donations to
candidates.97 Similarly, the prevention of such “conduit corruption” provides a constitutional
foundation for limiting both party support for candidates and private donor support for parties.
In their Colorado Republican amicus brief, the political scientists in the Committee for
Party Renewal, however, denied that unlimited party spending presented a danger of conduit
corruption. As they put it: “Parties are too large and too diverse to be controlled by any special
98 Amicus brief, supra, at 16.
99 518 U.S. at 647.
100 41 F. Supp.2d at 1211.
Judge Nottingham defined corruption narrowly as a literal exchange of dollars for
legislative votes, and rejected the idea that corruption could include more indirect influences of
campaign contributions on legislative decision-making.  See id. at 1209-11. There is evidence,
however, that campaign contributions have their primary impact on  legislative participation in
committees. Contributions make it more likely members will work actively to support the interests
of donors, as by proposing and supporting amendments, opposing hostile amendments, or
participating in a committee mark-up. See Richard L. Hall & Frank W. Wayman, Buying Time:
Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees, 84 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 797 (1990). Such action may as valuable to donors as votes on the floor of Congress.
101 See Gard v Wisconsin State Elections Bd., 456 N.W.2d 809, 821-24 (Wis. 1990); State
v Alaska Civil Liberties Union, supra, 978 P.2d at 626; Citizens for Responsible Government
State Political Action v Buckley, 60 F.Supp.2d 1066, 1079-82 (D. Colo. 1999).
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interest. The old rule of sanitary engineers applies: the solution to pollution is dilution.”98 Justice
Thomas, in his Colorado Republican opinion, agreed that American political parties have 
“numerous members with a wide variety of interests” so that “the influence of any one person or
the importance of any single issue within a political party is significantly diffused,” and “there is
little risk that an individual donor could use a party as a conduit for bribing candidates.”99Judge
Nottingham, in his opinion in the Colorado Republican remand reached a similar conclusion,
finding “contributor-to-party-to-candidate pressure” to be “an unlikely avenue of corruption.”100  
By contrast, two state supreme court and one federal district court decisions have relied
on the possibility of conduit corruption in upholding the constitutionality of state laws limiting
party donations to candidates in state races.101 The Wisconsin Supreme Court looked to the
legislative history of the state’s campaign finance law, which discussed the danger that PACs
could evade the limits on their donations to candidates by using the parties as conduits for PAC
102 Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 626. The Alaska Supreme Court also upheld
limits imposed by the state legislature on contributions to the parties. See id. at 625.
103 Citizens for Responsible Government, supra, 60 F. Supp.2d at 1080-81. The court also
found that limits on contributions to the parties “are an appropriate means by which to protect the
integrity of the entire system of campaign contributions” but determined that the specific dollar
contribution limit in the Colorado law was lower than could be justified by the purpose of
preventing corruption. See id. at 1088-89. 
104 See Kolodny, supra, at 79, 86, 90, 94, 97; Brooks Jackson, HONEST GRAFT: BIG
MONEY AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS 56 (1988). See also Shea, supra, at 25. 
105 Such a direct pass-along of donations is illegal under 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(8) which
provides that contributions by an individual or a PAC which “are in any way earmarked or
otherwise directed through an intermediary or conduit” to a candidate “shall be treated as
contributions from such person to such a candidate.”
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funds. The Alaska Supreme Court cited an affidavit from a former governor of the state who
stated “that pass-throughs (donations to a party that are earmarked for a candidate for a
candidate) under the pre-reform system ‘made a mockery of contribution limits and turned
political parties into money launderers.’”102 A federal district court in Colorado upheld that state’s 
restriction on party spending in support of candidates because of evidence that the state’s
Republican party had been used as a conduit for PAC contributions to candidates.103
Certainly, the national party committees have the capacity to launder donations. Prior to
the enactment of FECA, the CCC’s typically operated as money conduits, funneling large
donations from particular contributors to specified candidates.104 To be sure, contemporary party
committees appear to be much more active and sophisticated in soliciting funds and determining
how those funds will be spent. For the most part, parties do not literally just hand over money
received from particular donors to specified candidate.105 Party committees can and do make their
own independent strategic judgments concerning the most important races, from the party’s
106 Biersack & Haskell, supra, at 161.
107 See FEC Info/Public Disclosure, Inc., “Soft Money Summary (issued 12/28/98),”
http://www.tray.com/fecinfo/_smrpt.htm (visited 11/17/99). FECA requires parties to itemize by
name of donor and the size of donation only those donations at or above $200. Consequently,
there is far more information about these donations than about donations under $200.
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perspective, for  deploying campaign money. But the rise of soft money, the enormous disparity
between FECA’s limits on individual and PAC donations to candidates and the much larger sums
given in soft money, and the role of federal officeholders in soliciting soft money contributions to
the parties suggest that donor-to-party-to-candidate conduit corruption is a real possibility.
Small donors may have little influence over how the parties use their donations, but a
substantial portion of hard money donations to the parties consists of very large gifts. In 1996,
86% of the hard money in excess of $200 given by individuals to the national party consisted of
gifts of more than $1000;  46% came in donations of more than $10,000. Large gifts were a
substantial, albeit slightly smaller share of donations to the national Republican party: Donations
in excess of $1000 amounted to 52% of hard money individual donations of $200 or more, while
donations in excess of $10,000 amounted to 15% of hard money individual donations.106
Soft money provides donors with even greater opportunities to reach candidates through
the parties. In 1997-98, there were almost 25,000 donors who gave $200 or more to the national
parties’ soft money accounts.107 Their contributions came to $176 million, or about 80% of total
party soft money. Of these, just 700 donors (or 3% of those giving $200 or more) provided 40%
of the aggregate amount provided by the $200+ donors, averaging about $97,000 each. As
previously noted, the top 390 donors each contributed $100,000 or more -- many contributed far
more than that. This is well above FECA’s $1000 per election limit on individual donations to 
108 See Jeffrey Taylor, GOP to Get ‘Soft Money” Tobacco Aid, WALL ST. J., January 7,
2000, at A16 (tobacco company executives say industry will donate “at least $7 million” toward
the 2000 elections “mostly in unregulated ‘soft money’ contributions to Republican Party
committees”).
109 Cf. Wesley Joe & Clyde Wilcox, Financing the 1996 Presidential Nominations: The
Last Regulated Campaign? in id. at 62 (“When individuals give $1000 to a presidential candidate
they cannot expect much in return, but a contribution of $500,000 or an industrywide contribution
of $4 million is perhaps a different matter.”).
110FEC, Proposed Rules, “Prohibited and Excessive Contribution; ‘Soft Money’”, 63 Fed.
Reg. 37722, 37728, July 13, 1998. 
111 Alison Mitchell, “The Making of a Money Machine: How Clinton Built His War
Chest,” New York Times, December 27, 1996.
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candidates and the Act’s $5000 per election limit on PAC donations to candidates. When all
donations from a particular sector or industry are aggregated, the sums in questions can be
enormous.108 Surely, such large donors can be expected to have some say over how their
contributions are spent, and can influence party giving and spending decisions109
Moreover,  party fund-raising practices establish close links between officeholders and
potential donors to the parties. Federal officials are directly involved in soliciting contributions for
the party committees’ soft money accounts.110 President Clinton and Vice President Gore  were
prominently involved in raising money for the Democratic party’s soft money operations, and Bob
Dole raised soft money in connection with his 1996 presidential bid. Democrats offered their
$50,000+ donors intimate dinners with the President, small-group coffees in the White House
Map Room, and over-night stays in the Lincoln Bedroom.111 Republicans provided members of
their Team 100 – those who gave $100,000 – with a three-day opportunity to golf with Senate
Majority Leader Lott, Speaker Gingrich, and then-House Appropriations Committee Chair (and
112 Katharine Q. Seelye, “GOP’s Reward for Top Donors: 3 Days With Party Leaders,”
New York Times, February 20, 1997.
113 Biersack & Haskell, supra, at 173.
114 See Daniel M. Yarmish, The Constitutional Basis for a Ban on Soft Money, 67
Fordham L. Rev. 1257, 1281 n. 217 (1998).
115 Phil Kuntz, “Cash-for-Access Policy Forums on Bills Are Common, Controversial in
Senate,” Wall St. Journal, January 25, 2000, at A20.
116 See, e.g., Susan B. Glasser, “Clinton Taps Big Donors For Special N.Y. Account,”
Washington Post, January 4, 2000 at A1 (without committing to donors to the Democratic Party
that funds raised by Hillary Rodham Clinton will be used in her New York Senate race, “at least
some of the contributors clearly believe their checks effectively amount to a quid pro quo. They
give money to the DSCC [Democratic Senate Campaign Committee], which puts it back into the
New York race.” )
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briefly Speaker-designate) Livingston at The Breakers at Palm Beach.112 In 1995-96, “[d]inners,
weekend outings, and regular events were regularly used by both major parties to give major
donors a sense that they are close to power.”113 The DNC  raised $27 million from the 350 people
invited to attend the celebrated White House coffees with President Clinton; $3.1 million came
from people who made their contributions within a week of attending the coffee.114 In the current
Congress, as the Wall Street Journal recently reported, “cash-for-access confabs on pending bills
are business as usual in Washington.”115
Certainly, parties are aware of which candidates, which dinners or other events, or which
fundraising appeals highlighting particular candidates, drew contributions from which donors.
Funds raised for the Democratic Party by Hillary Rodham Clinton, for example, are likely to be
spent by the party in coordination with, or issue advocacy for, her New York Senate race even if
the money is not specifically marked for her campaign. 116 
Finally, fundraising for party committees does not simply provide donors with special
117 See, e.g., Aldrich, supra, at 10.
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access to specific federal candidates, but directly connects large donors with the federal
government itself. Political scientists conventionally distinguish among the “party-in-electorate,”
the “party-as-organization,” and the “party-in-government.”117 Under this division, the “party-as-
organization” provides financial, staff and other resources for party candidates, while the “party-
in-government,” organizes the executive branch and Congress, provides legislative leadership,
determines the composition and control of committees, and ultimately, shapes the legislative
agenda, the policy-making process and the decisions and votes of those who hold elective office.
Under the current campaign finance system, however, the “party-as-organization” and the “party-
in-government” are increasingly merged.  Members of Congress constitute and control the CCC’s
that play the leading role in providing party money and campaign services to congressional
candidates. The President typically controls his party’s national committee, and once a favorite
has emerged for the presidential nomination of the other party, that candidate and his party’s
national committee typically work closely together. As a result, large donations to the party
organization are effectively donations not just to specific candidates but to the party-in-
government’s leadership, who use that money to protect or expand their power in government, by
spending in congressional races and the presidential election. 
The danger, then, is not simply that party committees will channel private money to
particular candidates, but that party leaders are providing large party donors with direct access to
the leaders of the government – who happen to be the party leaders themselves. Party committees
do not so much dilute and “cleanse” private interest money as centralize it and focus it on the
President and the congressional leadership. This can make it easier for large private interests to
118 See, e.g., Sorauf, If Buckley Fell, supra, at 31 (party committees offer donors “longer-
run personal relationships with important, even leading policy-makers. Above all, they offer
access to a whole cohort of party candidates and incumbents rather than access merely to a single
candidate or incumbent”).
119 120 S. Ct. 897, 905-08 (2000).
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influence the legislative process. Instead of donors having to reach out to multiple individual
members of Congress, contributions to party campaign committees place donors in direct contact
with the legislators who dominate the legislative process.118 There is now the potential for large
donors to “corrupt” the parties, and, thus, to “corrupt” the government itself since the party
leaders for party-fundraising purposes are increasingly the leaders of government themselves.
Given the web of relations linking major donors, party committees, and elected officials,
large donations to the parties and spending by the parties in support of their candidates clearly
implicates Buckley’s concern with quid pro quo corruption. The evidence from the states, the very
large size of soft money contributions, and the role of the president and leading members of
Congress in fundraising for the parties all suggest that conduit corruption is a danger in practice
as well as in theory. Certainly there is evidence sufficient under the standard recently articulated in
Nixon v Shrink Missouri Government PAC,119 to support both limits on donations to the parties
and direct party support for candidates.
III. Reforming the Party Money Rules
The parties are eroding the basic elements of our campaign finance system. Due to the
combination of party issue advocacy and independent spending, limits on party spending in
support of candidates are effectively nonexistent. This undermines the spending limits that are a
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central feature of publicly funded presidential elections, and that would probably be a part of any
system for the public funding of congressional elections. The parties’ circumvention of FECA’s
limits on their spending in congressional elections also enables large donors to effectively avoid
FECA’s contribution limits. The rise of soft money, and its growing use in paying for party issue
advocacy, has substantially undermined the restrictions on the ability of wealthy donors,
corporations and unions to participate financially in federal elections. Campaign finance reform
cannot survive unless the loopholes developed or exploited by the parties are plugged. 
This can be done, consistent with the Buckley doctrine, provided the differences between
parties and other political organizations are taken into account in interpreting Buckley.  The
structural and functional differences between parties and PACs should lead to a broader reading
of coordination and express advocacy when party spending concerning party candidates is at
stake. So, too, the nexus of large donors, party committees and the parties-in-government
adequately justifies limits on all donations to the parties, and on party support for candidates.   
Reforming the party money rules, however, should not consist solely of the imposition of
new restrictions on the parties. Party money also plays a positive role in the campaign finance
system. Parties devote a substantial portion of their funds to promoting political participation,
including voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives. Far more than PACs and wealthy
individuals, party committees give their money to challengers, thereby promoting the value of
electoral competition. And party money reflects a broader range of groups and concerns than
money provided by single-issue organizations or special interest PACs. As a result, once FECA is
amended to subject all party money involved in federal election campaigns to regulation, it would
be consistent with democratic values of participation, electoral competition, and public-regarding
120 FEC v. Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp.2d 45, 92 (D.D.C. 1999).
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government decision-making, to expand the authorized financing role of the parties.
Congress should take steps, along the lines laid out in this section, to ensure that all party
money used in federal elections is hard money, subject to contribution and spending limits. Once
that is accomplished some of the hard limits, particularly those dealing with party spending, ought
to be raised to take account of the positive role parties can play in the electoral process.
A. Independent Spending
As I suggested in Part II, Colorado Republican’s protection for party independent
spending reflects a view that parties are little different from PACs and ignores the ongoing
structural relationships and shared electoral goals of candidates and their parties. Assuming that
Colorado Republican remains good law, and that its conclusions that parties are capable of
engaging in independent spending and that, when they do so, their spending is constitutionally
protected from limitation, remain good law, the key goal of campaign finance reform ought to be
the redefinition of  “independence” in the party context.
Currently, whether spending is independent or coordinated with a candidate turns on the
relationship between the candidate and the spender  with respect to specific communications.
Spending is deemed coordinated only when the candidate or her agents exercised control over, or
engaged in “substantial discussion or negotiation between the campaign and the spender’ over a
communication’s (1) contents; (2) timing; (3) location, mode, or intended audience . . . or (4)
‘volume’ (e.g., number of copies of printed materials or frequency of media spots).”120
Such a standard may make sense with respect to spending by PACs and individuals.  PACs
and political activists are structurally distinct from the candidates they are backing, and they have
121 FEC Proposed Rules on Independent Expenditures and Party Committee Expenditure
Limitations, 62 Fed. Reg. 24367, 24369-70 (May 5, 1997).
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goals other than the election of candidates. PACs and candidates lack ongoing organizational
relationships so that effective coordination may require close interactions concerning particular
communications. Moreover, PAC speech – even PAC speech expressly calling for the election of
a candidate -- may reflect an alternative or additional goal of getting a particular issue before the
electorate and making that issue central to the campaign. As a result,  requiring collaboration
concerning a particular message as a precondition to a finding of coordination protects the PAC’s
interests in speaking independently. 
Parties, however, are in quite a different relationship to their candidates. There are so
many ongoing and longstanding ties between candidates and parties that coordination may be
easily accomplished without formal contacts concerning a particular ad. As the FEC has noted, 
“party committees are in regular contact with their candidates, help develop candidate
messages and campaign strategy, and routinely share overlapping consultants, pollsters,
fundraisers, and other campaign agents. . . . These consultations, discussions, and
arrangements involve face-to-face meetings, telephone conversations, and exchanges of
paper and electronic mail on a regular basis, sometimes daily, and take place at both the
staff level and higher levels.”121 
More importantly, once a party has embraced a candidate, their electoral goals are the
same -- the election of that candidate. Parties do not seek to interject new issues into the
campaign; they seek to help their candidates win so that the party can hold or retain power in
government.  Consequently, the central issue in determining whether party spending is
independent or coordinated should be not whether the particular communication is independent or
coordinated, but whether the party has firmly allied itself with the candidate it is supporting.  . 
I would argue that a party has so committed itself to a candidate (i) once it has nominated
122 The proposal is at odds with Minnesota Republican Party v Pauly, supra, which
invalidated a Minnesota law that provided that party spending in support of a nominee is
presumptively coordinated with the candidate. Pauly is mistaken and should not be followed.
 The Shays-Meehan bill passed by the House of Representatives in 1998 and 1999 includes
a more limited proposal, providing that once a party has nominated a candidate it can make either
independent or coordinated spending for that candidate but not both. See 106th Congress, H.R.
417, § 205. That proposal would allow a party to engage in unlimited spending on behalf of a
nominee, as well as to engaged in both coordinated and independent spending for the candidate
prior to formal nomination. This does not adequately limit party spending.
123 Issue ads are also exempt from FECA’s reporting and disclosure requirements. That
may be less important for the national political party committees which are independently subject
to reporting and disclosure requirements, but it does allow issue spending by nonparty groups to
avoid disclosure.
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the candidate or  (ii) made a direct contribution to, or a coordinated expenditure with, a
candidate. This accepts the constitutional point of the Colorado Republican plurality that a party
organization may engage in election-related spending before it commits itself to a particular
candidate, and that such spending should enjoy the protections available to independent
expenditures. But this proposal -- which would be implemented by an amendment to FECA
spelling out the definition of coordinated expenditure -- recognizes the real world facts that once a
party has tied itself to a candidate, the party and the candidate are organizationally intertwined
and they share the exact same electoral agenda, the election of the candidate.122  
B. Party Issue Advocacy
Party issue advocacy is an even greater threat to the campaign finance laws than party
independent spending since not only is issue advocacy exempt from spending limits but issue ads
may be paid for with soft money, thus, providing wealthy individuals, corporations, and unions to
participate directly in financing campaign ads.123 Thus, controlling party issue advocacy ought to
be the most pressing issue for campaign finance reform.
124 See Issue Advocacy, supra, 77 Tex. L. Rev. at 1782-87.
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My approach to party issue advocacy is essentially the same as my approach to party
independent spending. The Constitution requires that Congress draw some bright, objective line
between election-related speech, which may be subject to regulation, and non-election-related
political speech, which is immune from regulation. That line must accurately distinguish between
election-related and non-election-related speech. Parties as well as PACs and individuals are
capable of engaging in non-election-related speech, and when they do so they should receive the
full protection the Constitution. But the placement of that line – the determination of which
communications are election-related, or express advocacy, and which are non-election-related, or
issue advocacy – is necessary affected by the identity of the speaker.
As I noted in Part II, non-party organizations and individuals have significant goals other
than winning elections. Indeed, for them even winning elections is likely to be a means to the end
of advancing certain policy goals, rather than an end in itself. When they engage in speech that
mingles references to elected officials or candidates and issues, it is quite possible that their aim is
to influence official decision-making or even the discussion of issues in the electoral context,
rather than the election itself. Although the presumption that speech includes references to
candidates that fall short of the “magic words” of express advocacy is about issues rather than
elections as the timing of the speech grows closer and closer to election day,124 it is still consistent
with a view that would provide the broadest possible protection for the political communications
of what are primarily non-electoral actors.
Parties are quite different. Their  preeminent concern of parties is winning elections, and
thereby winning political power. When party communications combine references to issues with
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references to a candidate, they are using the issues to advance the candidate and win the election;
they are not using the candidate to advance the issues. 
To be sure, not all party speech need be election related. Party activists, including party
elected officials, are interested in issues, and it is possible for party committees to spend money
whose sole purpose and likely effect is to influence public thinking about issues. And party speech
that is truly about issues is entitled to the same constitutional protection as the issue speech of
other organizations. The question, then, is -- in light of the distinctive electoral focus of the major
political parties and the evidence presented in Part II of how parties have come to use speech
currently defined as issue advocacy to advance their electoral agendas -- where to place the
elections/politics line when party spending is at stake.
All communications by the committees of the major political parties that clearly identify by
name or likeness a candidate for federal office ought to be treated as express advocacy. This
approach is consistent with the First Amendment goal of avoiding vague regulation: The “clearly
identified candidate” test provides a bright, objective line for distinguishing one set of
communications from another. Parties that want to disseminate messages concerning issues as
long as their messages avoid referring to clearly identified candidates.  But the test also reflects
the evidence that party communications that mention candidates -- even those that eschew the
“magic words” -- are really part of the party’s campaign to promote the election or defeat of the
candidates mentioned. This test would protect true party issue advocacy, but it would define such
issue advocacy in a way that corresponds to the distinctive institutional function of political party
committees, to the balance of electoral and issue goals in spending by the major parties, and to the
ways parties have used advertising that is clearly election-related but outside the current definition
125 Buckley v Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. at 79.
126 Consistent with the distinction between coordinated and independent spending, party
spending that refers to a candidate would still be independent, and exempt from FECA’s spending
limits, if the party had not nominated the candidate (or, where the speech is critical of the
candidate, had not nominated her opponent) or contributed to the candidate (or her opponent).
127 The Shays-Meehan bill, which has twice passed the House of Representatives would
widen the definition of express advocacy to include communications that (i) express 
“unmistakable and unambiguous support for or opposition to one or more clearly identified
candidates when taken as a whole and  with limited reference to external events, such as proximity
to an election;” or (ii) refer to a clearly identified candidate and are aired on television or radio
within sixty days of an election in a state in which the candidate is running. 106th Congress, H.R.
417, §201; 105th Cong., H.R. 3526, §201. The FEC, by regulation, has adopted the
“unmistakable and unambiguous support” test, 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b), but that regulation has
been invalidated in the courts. See Maine Right to Life Comm., Inc. v FEC, 914 F. Supp. 8 (D.
Me. 1996), aff’d 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996); Right to Life of Dutchess County, Inc. v FEC, 6 F.
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of express advocacy as integral parts of their election campaigns.
        In effect, this approach links up party speech to candidate speech. All expenditures by a
candidate are subject to FECA’s hard money requirements – and an expenditure by a publicly
funded candidate is subject to spending limits – whether or not the candidate expenditures,
include candidate ads, contain express advocacy. The mere fact that the spending is incurred, and
the message broadcast by, a candidate is enough to establish that it is election-related.125  Parties
are not quite candidates, and they may have goals other than the election of a candidate. But at
the point when a party communication clearly refers to a federal candidate, it can be safely
assumed that the party is working to elect or defeat that candidate. Once it has clearly invoked the
name of likeness of a candidate, the party has crossed the line from the discussion of issues
generally into participation. Any such speech would have to be hard money funded.126
This recommendation goes much further than the other principal proposals for regulating
issue ads,127  but its tight focus on party ads justifies its broader definition of express advocacy.
Supp.2d 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). See also Kansans for Life v Gaede, 38 F. Supp. 2d 928 (D. Kan.
1999) (enjoining Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission from enforcing a definition of express
advocacy that is broader than an explicit call for a vote for or against a candidate). See also Issue
Advocacy, supra, 77 Tex. L. Rev. at 1780-87 (reviewing proposal for regulating issue advocacy).
128 See Biersack & Haskell, Spitting on the Umpire, in Green, supra, at 172.
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Party issue ads are far more dangerous to the campaign finance system because, as the activities
of the 1996 presidential election demonstrate, these ads link up unlimited corporate, union, and
individual soft money donations directly fundraising by elected officials and to candidates’
campaigns, and they directly undermine the limits on spending by publicly funded candidates By
the same token, because leading federal officials are centrally involved in the fundraising that pays
for issue advocacy, and because issue advocacy has become such an integral part of candidates’
campaigns, it is much easier to justify  stringent regulation of party issue ads than it would be for
issue ads of non-party organizations or individuals
C. Soft Money 
The constitutional case for eliminating soft money contributions is relatively straight-
forward. As a form of contribution, soft money can be regulated if it presents a danger of
corruption or the appearance of corruption. Given the very large number of very large soft money
donations by individuals, corporations, unions and other organizations, and the direct involvement
of federal officials in raising soft money, the corruption danger posed by soft money is manifest.
The current,  administratively created exemption for soft money is based on the theory that soft
money is used for nonfederal purposes, but over the last two decades soft money has been spent
largely to influence federal elections. In 1996, roughly one-quarter of all national party soft money
expenditures was undertaken by the four party Congressional campaign committees.128 These are
129 See Crotty, Political Parties, in Maisel, supra, at 212. (In 1996 the DNC “worked
interchangeably with the White House as an extension of the President’s campaign.”)
130 See, e.g., Bibby, State Party Organizations, in Maisel, supra, at 43-44.
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organizations composed of members of Congress whose sole raison d’etre is the election of
federal candidates. How is it possible for any of that money to be considered nonfederal in any
meaningful sense? The remainder of the national party soft money spending was undertaken by
the Democratic and Republican National Committees which, in presidential election years, are
heavily focused on the winning that election.129Soft money spending by state parties, in turn, is
also usually controlled by the national committees that are the sources of state party soft money
funds.130 
Soft money, like hard money, is used to fund  federal election activity. To be sure some
soft money is used to fund activities, such as voter registration and partisan voter mobilization
drives, that truly benefit both federal and nonfederal candidates. Even then the nonfederal
component also benefits federal candidates, since allowing any soft money to be used for such
activities frees up hard money that would otherwise have been used to fund those activities and
allows the parties to spend more on direct contributions to candidates or coordinated
expenditures involving express advocacy that legally must be hard-money financed. Moreover,
soft money fundraising creates a web of relationships between large donors and federal candidates
and officials that clearly raise the potential for quid pro quos and the appearance of undue
influence.
Professor Bradley Smith has argued assert that since party issue advocacy expenditures
are constitutionally protected from limitation, it would be unconstitutional to limit soft money
131 See Smith, supra, 24 J. LEGIS. at 196-99.
132 424 U.S. at 23-35.
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contributions to the parties that are used to fund party issue advocacy.131 I have just argued that in
the party context express advocacy may be more expansively defined so as to cover most of what
is now currently considered to be issue advocacy. If so, such advocacy would have to be hard-
money funded. Even if I am mistaken, and party spending that currently falls under the rubric of
issue advocacy is immune from limitation, soft money restrictions, including restrictions on soft
money that would be used to fund issue advocacy, ought nevertheless to be constitutional.
Buckley held that even though expenditures by candidates may not be limited because they present
no danger of corruption, the contributions that finance those expenditures may be regulated when
they present dangers of quid pro quos that undermine the integrity of the political process. 132 So,
too, even if so-called issue advocacy expenditures undertaken by the parties are immune from
restriction, limits on contributions to the parties used to fund issue advocacy are unconstitutional
if they are necessary to ameliorate the danger that such contributions may corrupt the political
process. Given the corruption dangers implicit in the process by which the soft money used to
fund party issue advocacy is raised, restrictions on soft money would be constitutionally valid.
Thus, FECA ought to be amended to provide that all money raised by federal officials and
candidates for their own campaigns or for their parties, all money raised by national party
committees, and money raised by state parties to be used in connection with federal election
activity ought to be hard money, that is, money that complies with the dollar limits and source
133 This is the essence of the Shays-Meehan bill, H.R. 417, supra, at § 323(a), (b), (e).
Shays-Meehan would allow state parties to continue to use money that does not comply with
FECA to pay for the nonfederal share of their administrative and overhead expenses, as
determined by the FEC, and it would permit federal officeholders to raise nonfederal money when
they are running for state office. See id. at § 323(b)(B) (v), (e)(2)These exceptions seem both
reasonable and consistent with the basic thrust of assuring the money used in federal elections
complies with the restrictions of federal election law.
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prohibitions of FECA.133 Such a measure is necessary to restore the integrity of the campaign
finance laws, and would surely be constitutional.
D. Raising the Hard Money Limits 
The goal of bringing all party money under FECA is not anti-party but pro-campaign
finance regulation. It does not assume that party participation in campaign financing is a bad
thing. Instead, it proceeds from the finding that party committees, because of their close
connections to both donors and candidates, occupy an uniquely strategic position in the campaign
finance system so that the failure to limit the parties will lead to the collapse of the system. Once
the parties are effectively brought under regulation, there is much to be said for an expanded party
role. Indeed, with its higher limits on donations to the national parties and its provisions for party
coordinated expenditures and grass-roots expenditures does give the parties there is much to be
said for a large, FECA already accords the parties a relatively privileged position.
Parties differ from PACs in at least three ways which would support a more prominent
position for the parties in funding campaigns. First, compared to PACs and individual donors,
parties are far more likely to give to challengers.  A central problem of our campaign finance
system is its failure to provide challengers with adequate funding. According to a recent study of
congressional elections by the Committee for Economic Development, “[t]he majority of House
challengers now raise and spend so little that they cannot wage a viable campaign.” Indeed, 60%
134COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, INVESTING IN THE PEOPLE’S BUSINESS: A
BUSINESS PROPOSAL FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, A Statement by the Research and Policy
Committee of the Committee for Economic Development 17 (1999).
135 Id. See also Herrnson in Green, supra, at 119 (in 1996, average House incumbent
outspent average House challenger by 2.7 to 1). The imbalance in Senate races was less dramatic,
with incumbents outspending challengers by about 1.5 to 1. See id. at 120, CED Report at 18.
136 Herrnson, supra, at 105.
137 See id. at 109-11 (in 1996, 88% of contributions of corporate PACs in House elections
went to incumbents; 62% of large individual hard money donations went to incumbents).
138 See id. at 102-04 (1999); MALBIN & GAIS, supra, at 145-52.
139 Party committees will also give heavily to incumbents facing serious opposition.
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of House incumbents “either had no significant opposition or outspent their opponents by a
margin of ten to one or more.”134 In 1998, the average House incumbent outspent the average
House challenger by 2.4 to 1.135 PACs and large individual donors contribute to the fiscal edge of
incumbency. Most PACs and large individual donors make contributions in order to obtain or
secure access to elected officials “who are in a position to influence regulations, a appropriations,
or treaties that effect the environment in which the PAC’s industry or workforce operates. These
groups consider campaign contributions an important tool for reaffirming or strengthening their
relationships with influential lawmakers.”136 PACs and individuals that follow access strategies
overwhelmingly favor incumbents with their contributions.137 
Parties, by contrast, are more likely to give to promising challengers.138 Party committees
use their money strategically to maximize their chances of winning control of Congress. That will
frequently dictate sending money to a promising challenger rather than reinforcing the overloaded
warchest of an incumbent facing only weak opposition.139
Second, parties devote a considerable portion of their spending to grass-roots activity,
140 See Smith, supra, 24 J. LEGIS. at 199-200. See also Stephen Ansolobehere & James M.
Snyder, Soft Money, Hard Money, Strong Parties, 100 Colum. L. Rev. xxx, xxx (contending that 
party spending increases increases turnout).
141 See text at notes 98-100, supra.
142 See, e.g., DARRELL M. WEST & BURDETT A. LOOMIS, THE SOUND OF MONEY: HOW
POLITICAL INTERESTS GET WHAT THEY WANTED 211 (1999
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such as voter registration and voter mobilization.140 Party spending, thus, can promote citizen
participation. The party label is an important cue for voters, providing general information about
candidate orientations over a range of policy issues. An enhanced  party campaign presence could
improve voter understanding of the candidates and the quality of voter decisions.
Finally, as the scholars and justices who argue that parties dilute special interest money141
have noted, parties are relatively broad-based organizations, so a substantial party role can
mitigate the politically balkanizing effects of advocacy by special interest groups.142 Parties will be
less effective at muting the voices of their special interest constituents when a handful of very
large donors play a preeminent role in financing party activities, but there is much to be said for
the dilution argument if the size of donations to the parties is capped.
Thus, a comprehensive campaign finance reform package ought to include some increase
in the levels of party support for party candidates as well as the elimination of soft money and of
opportunities for unlimited party spending. Reforming donations to the parties to bar corporate,
union and large individual contributions would ameliorate the corruption dangers posed by party
spending. Raising permitted party spending levels would then increase the opportunities for
parties to support challengers, promote political participation, and reduce the dependence of
candidates on funds provided by narrowly-focused special interest groups. Such a combination of
143 See Herrnson in Green, supra, at 119-20.
144 See Sorauf, What Buckley Wrought, supra, at 52.
145 The importance of soft money in presidential elections is also directly traceable to the
inadequate levels of presidential public funding. The initial public funding allotment was set too
low, and the subsequent adjustments have been inadequate to keep pace with rising campaign
costs. See Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U. PENN. L. REV.
563, 580 (1999).
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tight controls on soft money and effective enforcement of spending limits with an increase in the
dollar level at which the limits are set could make soft money and spending restrictions more
politically palatable while resulting in a better campaign finance system than soft money and
spending controls alone.
At present, parties provide only a modest portion -- around ten percent -- of the hard
money funds spent by congressional candidates, which is far less than the shares provided by
wealthy individuals or PACs.143 The case for increasing FECA’s spending levels is reinforced by
the rapidly increasing costs of congressional elections. FECA’s limits on party direct contributions
to candidates were set in 1974, and have not been adjusted for inflation. The limits on coordinated
contributions have been adjusted for inflation, but the rate of increase in congressional campaign
costs in the period between 1976 and 1996 was more than treble the rate of inflation.144 Indeed, it
is reasonable to conclude that one of the reasons for the rise in soft money is that, in the absence
of public funding it is increasingly difficult for congressional candidates to raise the money they
now need while complying with FECA’s unindexed contribution limits and inadequately indexed
coordinated spending limits.145 
Consequently, once soft money is eliminated and all money contributed to party
committees for federal election purposes is subject to FECA’s contribution limits and prohibitions,
146 Even if soft money is eliminated, limits on party spending outside the public funding
context would remain appropriate. FECA’s hard money limits allow PACs and individuals to
make far larger contributions to party committees than to candidates, so that unlimited party
spending would still allow party donors to evade the limits on donations to candidates. Moreover,
the Republican Party has consistently done better than the Democrats in raising hard money.
Eliminating the limits on hard money spending could unbalance the two-party system.
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it would be a sensible campaign finance policy to raise the limits on party contributions to, and
coordinated expenditures to candidates. The contribution limits should at least be trebled to take
into account the increase in the cost of living over the past quarter-century and indexed
henceforth. The coordinated expenditure limits, which have been rising with inflation, could be
doubled to take into account the difference between the inflation rate and the more rapid increase
in campaign costs.146
E. Conclusion: Campaign Finance Reform and Party Reform
Bringing the parties back under FECA -- which is essential for the integrity of the
campaign finance laws -- should not be seen as anti-party. Once the principle that the parties are
fully subject to campaign finance regulation is fully established, and the dangers that large donors
will use the parties to subvert the campaign finance laws is ameliorated, the actual limits on the
parties could be relaxed to take into account the positive role the parties play in the political
process.  Moreover, some restrictions on party campaign finance activity may be in the best
interest of the parties. The current system, dominated by soft money and soft-money financed
issue advocacy, empowers large donors and centralizes party finances and power within the
parties in Washington. When party leaders can raise huge sums at White House coffees or
Speakers’ Club retreats, they necessarily become more sensitive to their interests of their big
donors, and less attentive to their less well-heeled party supporters. When state party
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organizations rely on soft money transfers from the national parties, they, too, may become less
attentive to their ordinary members and less focused on activities that build the party from the
bottom up. The soft money system subtly transforms the parties from grass-roots clubs to Capitol
Hill organizations. Controlling large donations to the parties could make the parties more and
participatory, and more accountable to their local activists and voters. 
In other words regulation of party campaign finance activity should not be seen as an
infringement on party rights or an interference with party interests, but as a means of making the
parties more faithful to their capacity to promote electoral competition, grass-roots political
activity, and broad-based approaches to the problems of governance.
